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THE SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT AS A RESPONSE TO 
STOCK OPTION BACKDATING 
INTRODUCTION 
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. recently came under investigation 
for backdating employee stock options and then attempting to conceal this 
practice from shareholders, regulators, and the public.1  Brocade, a company 
that creates products to connect computer servers with data-storage systems,2 
restated its earnings, reducing income by over $300 million to reflect that its 
stock options had been accounted for improperly.3  Former chief executive 
officer Gregory Reyes and Stephanie Jensen, the head of the human resources 
department, were convicted of criminal charges in federal court for regularly 
backdating stock options from 2000 to 2004 and concealing millions of dollars 
in related expenses.4  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought 
civil charges against the company and both executives individually.5  In May 
2007, the company settled the SEC’s securities fraud suit by agreeing to pay a 
seven million dollar penalty.6 
The SEC and the United States Department of Justice are not the only ones 
taking action.  Many of the company’s shareholders have responded by filing 
 
 1. See Therese Poletti & Scott Duke Harris, Firms to Pay Fines on Options: Brocade, 
Mercury Settle Backdating Charges with SEC, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 1, 2007, at A1. 
 2. Jordan Robertson, Ex-CEO Convicted of Options Fraud: Brocade’s Reyes Guilty on All 
Counts in First Backdating Case to Go to Trial, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at C1. 
 3. See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock 
Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1610 (2007). 
 4. Brocade Ex-Official Convicted, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2007, at C7; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice and SEC, U.S. Attorney’s Office and SEC Separately Charge Former Brocade 
CEO and Vice President in Stock Option Backdating Scheme (July 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-121.htm.  The two were accused of falsifying 
company documents to cover up the backdating practice.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
and SEC, supra.  Reyes was convicted of ten felony counts in the first backdating case to reach a 
jury.  See Robertson, supra note 2.  He was sentenced to twenty-one months in prison and ordered 
to pay a $15 million fine, but his sentence has been stayed pending appeal.  Pete Carey, 21 
Months for Reyes, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 17, 2008, at C1.  Jensen was convicted of 
conspiracy and falsifying corporate records.  Brocade Ex-Official Convicted, supra.   She was 
sentenced to four months in prison and ordered to pay a $1.25 million fine.  Brocade Ex-
Employee Gets 4 Months in Prison, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2008, at A13. 
 5. See Poletti & Harris, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
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derivative suits against Brocade’s directors based on allegations of a corporate-
wide practice of backdating stock options.7  The parties in one of the derivative 
actions actually reached a settlement agreement involving significant corporate 
governance changes for Brocade as well as payment of the plaintiff’s legal 
fees, but the judge was critical of the terms and refused to approve the 
agreement.8  Another derivative suit was recently dismissed for failing to state 
a claim,9 but at least one such suit is still pending.10  Other shareholders joined 
together to bring a class action suit against Brocade and its directors, asserting 
violations of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.11  The 
action survived an early motion to dismiss.12 
The Brocade case is not unique.  Studies suggest that the practice of 
backdating employee stock options in corporate America may have been 
widespread.13  In the last few years, well over one hundred companies have 
conducted internal inquiries, issued restatements, or come under investigation 
by the SEC and the United States Department of Justice based on claims of 
 
 7. See Roth v. Reyes, No. C 06-02786 CRB, 2007 WL 2470122, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 
2007). 
 8. See Julie Creswell, One Route Seems Closed, So Lawyers Try Different Lawsuit in Stock-
Option Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at C4 (“You have item after item after item of 
malfeasance by all these defendants—then it’s sort of a Roseannadanna situation: ‘Oh, never 
mind,’ Judge Breyer told lawyers at a hearing.”).  Judge Breyer’s Saturday Night Live reference 
confuses Gilda Radner’s Roseanne Roseanadanna character with her Emily Litella character, who 
regularly ended her Weekend Update segments with “never mind.” 
 9. Roth, 2007 WL 2470122, at *6–7 (explaining that plaintiffs based their theory of liability 
on inapplicable provisions of the insider trading statutes). 
 10. Id. at *1. 
 11. See Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 1, Smajlaj v. Brocade Commc’ns 
Sys., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-02042-CRB, 2007 WL 2457534 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) (citing 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008)). 
 12. Smajlaj v. Brocade Commc’ns Sys., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-02042-CRB, 2007 WL 2457534, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) (holding that it could be reasonably inferred from the complaint’s 
detailed allegations that the directors bringing the motion knew, “or were reckless in not 
knowing,” that backdating was occurring). 
 13. Eric Dash, Study Charts Broad Manipulation of Options, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, at 
C2; Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006, at A1; 
see also Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802 (2005); David 
Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. 
FIN. 449 (1997); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., 
Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 566, 2006) [hereinafter Lucky CEOs], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=945392; Lucian Bebchuk et al., Lucky Directors (John M. Olin Ctr. for 
Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 573, 2006) [hereinafter Lucky 
Directors], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952239. 
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stock option backdating.14  Some companies have faced civil penalties,15 and in 
other cases former executives have been charged criminally.16 
As the Brocade case illustrates, there are a number of avenues available for 
addressing the misconduct associated with the practice of backdating stock 
options.  The possibilities include criminal charges, civil suits by the SEC 
against companies, civil suits by the SEC against individuals within the 
companies, and actions brought by the shareholders against the companies and 
directors.  Shareholders could bring direct suits, often in the form of class 
actions, alleging that backdating constituted a securities law violation, 
particularly of Rule 10b-5 which prohibits deceptive nondisclosures or 
misstatements.17  Shareholders could also bring derivative suits, asserting that 
by backdating directors breached their fiduciary duties.18  A main difference 
between these two shareholder suits is that a derivative suit is brought by the 
shareholder on behalf of the corporation, so any recovery goes to the 
corporation, while damages in a direct suit are awarded directly to the 
shareholders.19  Damages awarded in a 10b-5 action would equal the amount 
the stock’s market value declined due to the deception.20  Since a majority of 
companies’ stock was not greatly affected by revelations of backdating, direct 
damages may be difficult to prove.21  This has led many shareholders to bring 
derivative suits instead of direct actions in backdating cases.22 
This Comment analyzes the shareholder derivative action based on 
allegations of stock option backdating.  It examines whether such suits will be 
successful and whether a derivative action is an appropriate forum for 
 
 14. See Corporate Crime in America: Collared, ECONOMIST, Aug. 11, 2007, at 54; Perfect 
Payday Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 4, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/public/ 
resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html. 
 15. See Backdated Options Cost Tech Firms Millions in Fines, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 2007, § 3, 
at 5. 
 16. Corporate Crime in America: Collared, supra note 14. 
 17. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). 
 18. See Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or “What’s a 
Lawsuit Between Friends in an ‘Incorporated Partnership?,’” 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1203, 
1215–16 (1996) (explaining that in a derivative suit, “the underlying transaction or conduct . . . is 
alleged to have caused some harm or breached some duty to the corporation”). 
 19. See id. at 1213–15; Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder 
Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1734 (1994). 
 20. Jeffrey M. Goldman, Avoiding Blurred Lines: The Computation of Damages in Rule 
10b-5 Securities Class Action Lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit and a Proposal for a More Sensible 
System, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 261, 265 (2006). 
 21. See Ashby Jones, Firms Settle Backdating Suits: Some Private Cases End in 
Agreements; More Deals Ahead?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007, at A15 (“[W]ord of options 
backdating typically didn’t lead to significant drops in share prices . . . .”). 
 22. See id. (noting that only about thirty class actions suits were filed in the wake of 
backdating revelations). 
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addressing corporate backdating.  Part I explains stock options in general and 
the process of backdating options.  Part II describes shareholder derivative 
actions and the obstacles the shareholder-plaintiff must overcome to bring a 
successful claim.  Part III examines the two Delaware cases that have laid the 
framework for future decisions in shareholder derivative suits filed in response 
to allegations of corporate backdating.  Finally, Part IV follows with an 
analysis of the somewhat conflicting results of those decisions and looks at the 
future of derivative actions based on backdating claims, concluding that if a 
shareholder can meet the challenge of showing the company’s directors 
knowingly issued backdated options, a derivative suit is the best forum for 
addressing and resolving the problem. 
I.  STOCK OPTIONS AND THE PRACTICE OF BACKDATING 
Stock options are a form of employee compensation.23  An option allows 
the holder to purchase company stock at a specified price, referred to as the 
strike or exercise price.24  Many employee stock options have a vesting period, 
after which employees can exercise the option.25  Exercising the option 
essentially requires that the issuing company sell, at the set strike price, a 
specified number of shares of its stock to the employee holding the option.26  
The strike price is agreed upon when the options are issued, and it is often 
equal to the current selling price of the stock, although there are other ways of 
setting the price.27 
When an employee exercises an option whose strike price equaled the 
stock’s selling price on the date the option was issued, the employee makes a 
profit if the stock’s selling price has since increased.28  The employee pays less 
to buy the stock than what it is currently worth in the market.  If the stock was 
selling for $50/share when the option was issued, the employee may purchase 
shares for $50, even if the stock is now selling for $60/share, giving the 
employee a $10/share profit.  It is possible that the strike price and market 
 
 23. See David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on 
the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 567 (2007). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Subcomm. on Executive Comp. of the Comm. on Employee Benefits and Executive 
Comp., A.B.A., Executive Compensation: A 1987 Road Map for the Corporate Advisor, 43 BUS. 
LAW. 185, 275 (1987) (stating that most options are subject to holding periods ranging from a few 
months to several years before the options can be exercised). 
 26. Melissa A. Chiprich & Phillip J. Long, Empirical Study, Is Midnight Nearing for 
Cinderella? Corporate America Faces Reality with Stock Option Accountability, 39 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1033, 1033–34 (2004). 
 27. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options, 
90 AM. ECON. REV. 209, 209 (2000). 
 28. See Narayanan et al., supra note 3, at 1602 (explaining that if “stock price at the time of 
exercise exceeds the exercise price” the difference is a payoff to the employee). 
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price remain equal when the option is exercised, in which case the option 
holder gains nothing.  The market price might also drop below the strike price, 
which makes the option worthless because it could only be exercised at a loss.  
These options, where the strike price equals the fair market value of the 
company’s stock on the date of issuance, are referred to as “at-the-money.”29  
The common rationale for granting options of this kind is to align employee 
interests with shareholder interests by giving employees personal incentives to 
increase the value of the company’s stock.30 
Stock options may also be issued “in-the-money.”31  This means the agreed 
upon strike price is lower than the stock’s selling price on the date the option is 
issued.32  If the company’s stock is currently trading for $50/share and on the 
same day the strike price is set at $40/share, the option is in-the-money.  The 
option holder essentially has a $10/share paper profit without the stock 
increasing in value.33 
When a company backdates the stock options it issues, it sets the strike 
price at the stock’s selling price from an earlier date.34  When backdating, 
companies assign the grants prior dates where the stock price was lower than 
on the date the option was actually issued, creating an in-the-money option, 
because the option can be exercised at a price lower than the stock’s current 
fair market value.35  Companies may legally grant in-the-money options, but 
 
 29. Walker, supra note 23, at 567. 
 30. John D. Shipman, Comment, The Future of Backdating Equity Options in the Wake of 
SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1194, 1199 (2007) (“Because 
equity option grants inherently link an executive’s compensation to the value of the company’s 
underlying stock, public companies generally adopt executive stock option plans to improve the 
performance of management and create a proprietary interest in the company to better align 
shareholder and management interests.  Properly structured equity option packages provide top 
executives with ‘a great incentive to raise the company’s share price, which increases both the 
value of his or her options and shareholder returns.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting TED ALLEN & 
SUBODH MISHRA, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., AN INVESTOR GUIDE TO THE STOCK 
OPTION TIMING SCANDAL 1 (2006))). 
 31. See Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option Plans, Executive 
Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, 148 n.31 (2000) (citing 
Roy F. Price, Note, Options, Waste and Agency Costs, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 391, 395 n.13 
(1995)). 
 32. Id. (explaining that this type of option would allow an employee to purchase stock below 
the present market value). 
 33. See Mark Maremont, Authorities Probe Improper Backdating of Options: Practice 
Allows Executives to Bolster Their Gains; A Highly Beneficial Pattern, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 
2005, at A1. 
 34. Ashwini Jayaratnam, Recent Development, Prosecuting Stock-Option Backdating: The 
Ethics of Enforcement Techniques, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 755, 755–56 (2007). 
 35. Stock Options Backdating: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Backdating Hearing], available at http://banking. 
senate.gov/public/_files/ACFB067.pdf (testimony of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC). 
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they must record a related compensation expense.36  Unfavorable tax 
consequences accompany in-the-money options, while at-the-money options 
qualify for more advantageous tax treatment.37  Until recent revisions to the 
rules came about, companies were not required to record any compensation 
expense when at-the-money options were granted, leading companies to prefer 
them over in-the-money options.38  Companies frequently adopted shareholder-
approved compensation plans restricting option pricing in order to avoid the 
negative tax and accounting consequences of in-the-money options.39 
Problems arose when companies attempted to disguise the fact that by 
backdating they were issuing in-the-money options.40  Companies tried to 
make it appear as though the options were actually granted on the prior date 
with the lower price.  Sometimes those issuing the options would falsify 
corporate records to give the appearance that the options were issued on the 
 
 36. See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus 
the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 863 (2002); see also ACCOUNTING 
FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES, Opinion of the Accounting Principles Bd. No. 25, ¶ 10 (Am. 
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972), reprinted in FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AS OF JULY 1, 1979, at 329 
(1979) (requiring that “a corporation recognize[] compensation cost for stock issued through 
compensatory plans unless the employee pays an amount . . . equal to the quoted market price of 
the stock at the measurement date”).  FASB eventually replaced this APB opinion, and in 2004 it 
issued a pronouncement requiring all companies to record the services received in exchange for 
option grants.  See SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 
123R, ¶ 9–10 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2004), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_ 
FAS123R.pdf. 
 37. See Walker, supra note 23, at 569 (explaining that in-the-money options do not allow the 
employee to be taxed at the lower long-term capital gains rate available for at-the-money options 
and that companies can only take limited deductions for in-the-money options, unlike at-the-
money options, which qualify as performance-based compensation); see also I.R.C. § 421(a)(1) 
(2000); id. § 162(m). 
 38. Walker, supra note 23, at 568–69; see id. at 570 (“Congress and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) severely penalized the grant of in-the-money options, and 
few public companies have granted such options.”). 
 39. See id. at 570.  However, some scholars have argued that while many company option 
plans require that the option’s exercise price equal the stock’s fair market value on the grant date, 
they do not technically require the grant date be the same date the decision to issue the option was 
made.  See Lie, supra note 13, at 807; Shipman, supra note 30, at 1217.  This claim ignores the 
fact that companies appeared to be prohibiting grants of in-the-money options. 
 40. See Backdating Hearing, supra note 35 (asserting that misrepresenting the option grant 
date disguises in-the-money options, giving the recipient a chance to realize larger gains, while 
the company avoids reporting compensation expense); Maremont, supra note 33 (explaining that 
backdating results in misleading disclosures because companies issue proxy statements claiming 
the strike price equals the stock’s market value on the grant date but then use an earlier date, 
where the price was lower). 
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earlier date.41  Studies show the chosen backdate was often one where the 
company’s stock was at its lowest selling price of the month, quarter, or even 
the year.42  Concealing the date on which the option was actually granted 
resulted in improper accounting and tax treatment, which led to misstated 
earnings.43  It also misled shareholders about the amount of compensation 
employees and executives received.44  Backdating allowed option holders to 
purchase stock at a greater discount than they would have received if the 
options had been priced at fair market value on the date of issuance, thereby 
lowering the amount the company was paid when the options were exercised.45  
In some cases backdating also amounted to a violation of the shareholder-
approved compensation plan.46 
In 2005, federal regulators began investigating whether companies were 
engaging in the practice of backdating stock options.47  Recent academic 
research had revealed a pattern of options being granted when stock prices had 
reached low points, only to rise again after the grants.48  Some suggested this 
indicated that executives waited to see how the market evolved before deciding 
which date would be the most beneficial for issuing stock options.49  SEC 
investigators initially opined that companies were timing option grants to 
coincide with positive corporate news, which would have the effect of 
 
 41. For example, executives at Brocade and Comverse Technologies, Inc. were accused of 
falsifying documents to hide backdating.  See Judith Burns, Ex-Counsel at Comverse Settles 
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2007, at A11; Steve Stecklow & Peter Waldman, Brocade Ex-
CEO Found Guilty in Backdating Case: Criminal Trial Victory for U.S. Likely to Serve as Model 
for Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007, at A3. 
 42. Walker, supra note 23, at 574. 
 43. See Executive Compensation: Backdating to the Future, Oversight of Current Issues 
Regarding Executive Compensation Including Backdating of Stock Options; Tax Treatment of 
Executive Compensation, Retirement and Benefits: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Executive Compensation Hearing], available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2005test/090606testpm.pdf (statement of Paul J. 
McNulty, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen.). 
 44. Id.; Walker, supra note 23, at 589–91 (stating that because the backdated options were 
recorded at values much lower than they were actually worth, the amount of compensation 
reported was significantly understated). 
 45. See Derivative Action Complaint at 9, 13, Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (No. 2213) (seeking recovery for the company of the difference between the exercise price 
and the stock’s fair market value on the actual date of the grant).  Some also argue that allowing 
option holders to purchase stock discounted below fair market value on the date of the grant 
dilutes share value.  See Executive Compensation Hearing, supra note 43. 
 46. See Walker, supra note 23, at 570. 
 47. Maremont, supra note 33. 
 48. Id.; Lie, supra note 13. 
 49. Maremont, supra note 33 (referencing Erik Lie explaining that his study showed 
“executives may have backdated options, already knowing how the market moved”). 
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increasing the stock price.50  However, as more information was gathered, the 
evidence suggesting the options were backdated became stronger.51  The data 
indicated that the practice was utilized in numerous companies.52 
The SEC’s early investigation into backdating targeted fewer than twenty 
companies.53  As time passed, the number of companies suspected of 
backdating greatly increased.  The SEC has now investigated over 140 
companies for backdating.54  Over eighty companies have restated their 
financials.55  More than 160 shareholder derivative suits have been filed 
against corporate directors for engaging in backdating schemes.56 
II.  DERIVATIVE SUITS 
Shareholders are suing corporate directors for backdating stock options.57  
Many have chosen to bring derivative suits because a direct suit against the 
board of directors is more difficult to sustain.58  In a derivative suit, the cause 
of action sought to be enforced belongs to the corporation.59  The shareholder 
alleges damage to the corporation, resulting in indirect harm to himself.60  In a 
backdating scenario, the plaintiff-shareholder asserts that by backdating the 
stock options the defendant-directors breached their fiduciary duties to the 
company. 
Since a derivative suit is brought on behalf of the corporation itself, any 
recovery goes to the corporation.61  Any damages the defendants owe will be 
awarded to the company, but often the directors who are sued have 
indemnification clauses in their employment agreements.62  This means the 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Forelle & Bandler, supra note 13. 
 52. See Dash, supra note 13; Stephanie Saul, Study Finds Backdating of Options 
Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2006, at C1; see also Lie, supra note 13; Lucky CEOs, supra 
note 13; Lucky Directors, supra note 13; Yermack, supra note 13. 
 53. Forelle & Bandler, supra note 13. 
 54. Eric Dash & Matt Richtel, Backdating Conviction, a Big First, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2007, at C2. 
 55. Jones, supra note 21. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text. 
 59. Mary Elizabeth Matthews, The Shareholder Derivative Suit in Arkansas, 52 ARK. L. 
REV. 353, 353 (1999). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Kraakman et al., supra note 19, at 1734. 
 62. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1083 
(2006) (“Almost all public companies have indemnification agreements with outside directors . . . 
providing that the corporation shall advance legal expenses and indemnify legal fees, damages, 
and amounts paid in settlement to the fullest extent permitted by law.”);  Nishchay H. Maskay, 
Comment, The Constitutionality of Federal Restrictions on the Indemnification of Attorneys’ 
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corporation has agreed to cover the directors’ liability, leading to the circular 
result where the damages paid to the company come from the company’s funds 
or its own insurance.63  However, indemnification is typically not allowed if 
the directors are found liable for intentional misconduct.64  Furthermore, even 
if the monetary recovery in a derivative suit is low, such suits often bring about 
changes in corporate governance.65  They also serve as a deterrent for 
directors, helping to prevent them from ignoring their fiduciary duties in the 
future. 
There are several procedural requirements for a shareholder to bring a 
derivative action.66  The shareholder must first demand that the board of 
directors handle the action on behalf of the corporation.67  Directors have the 
authority to manage the corporation, which includes the power to decide 
whether the corporation should bring a lawsuit.68  Thus, the shareholder is 
expected to bring an issue to the board before taking other action so that the 
directors have an opportunity to decide how to pursue the matter, if at all.69  
The ideal situation is that once a shareholder makes a meritorious demand, the 
board recognizes the harm to the company and acts to address it.  However, the 
typical board response to a shareholder’s demand is a decision not to take 
action.70  If the board rejects the shareholder’s demand, the shareholder is free 
to file a complaint on behalf of the corporation.71 
The defendants, typically the company’s directors, will invariably file a 
motion to dismiss asserting that their decision to reject the demand is protected 
by the business judgment rule.72  This rule protects reasonable decisions made 
 
Fees, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 491, 497 (2007) (“Indemnification has become common in American 
companies.”). 
 63. See Kraakman et al., supra note 19, at 1736, 1745–47. 
 64. Sandra K. Miller, The Duty of Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability While 
Minimizing Judicial Interference, 87 NEB. L. REV. 125, 149 & n.102 (2008) (explaining that 
under Delaware law an indemnification agreement may not limit a director’s liability for 
intentional misconduct or other acts not in good faith). 
 65. See Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance 
Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings, 42 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 163 (2007) (concluding that shareholder derivative suits 
“ultimately lead to beneficial adjustments in corporate governance”). 
 66. See Thomas P. Kinney, Comment, Stockholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility 
Where the Board Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 173 (1994). 
 67. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
 68. See Tamar Frankel & Wayne M. Barsky, The Power Struggle Between Shareholders and 
Directors: The Demand Requirement in Derivative Suits, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39, 48–49 (1983); 
Kinney, supra note 66, at 173, 176. 
 69. Kinney, supra note 66, at 175–76. 
 70. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408 (2005); Kinney, supra note 66, at 176. 
 71. Kinney, supra note 66, at 172, 176. 
 72. Id. at 176. 
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by informed, independent, disinterested directors from judicial scrutiny.73  “[I]t 
creates ‘a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and 
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the 
company.’”74  Essentially, the rule assumes that directors act in accordance 
with their fiduciary duties.  The shareholder must then show that the directors’ 
decision to reject demand is not protected by this rule, either because the 
directors are not disinterested,75 they failed to fully inform themselves before 
making the decision,76 or the decision had no rational business purpose and 
could not have been in the corporation’s best interest.77  This is a high standard 
for shareholders to overcome, and courts will often defer to the board’s 
decision, resulting in the case being dismissed.78 
Shareholders do have the option of not making a demand on the board.79  
The directors would then bring a motion to dismiss for failure to make a 
demand, and the shareholder would allege that demand is futile and therefore 
excused.80  The shareholder must show that the board could not have made an 
“unbiased business judgment” in considering the demand if it had been made.81  
This will require alleging that a majority of the directors on the board were 
interested in the underlying transaction, or not independent of those who were, 
 
 73. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988). 
 74. Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 75. Craig W. Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of Directors’ Duties in 
Delaware: The Rules of the Game (Part 1), 40 VILL. L. REV. 1297, 1309–12 (1995) (noting that a 
director has a disqualifying self-interest violating the duty of loyalty if the interest “is material or 
substantial enough” to cause the director to decide differently than he would otherwise or if the 
director is not independent of another director with such a self-interest). 
 76. Id. at 1307–08 (explaining that uninformed or misinformed decisions would violate the 
directors’ duty of care). 
 77. See id. at 1313–15. 
 78. Fairfax, supra note 70, at 408; see Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993) 
(“[B]ecause . . . derivative suits challenge the propriety of decisions made by directors pursuant to 
their managerial authority, . . . plaintiffs must overcome the powerful presumptions of the 
business judgment rule . . . .”); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) 
(declaring that boards of directors are “better-suited than courts to make business decisions”).  
Courts want boards of directors to be free to make managerial decisions without fearing litigation 
over the decision anytime a shareholder disagrees.  See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment 
Rule Revisted, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 95 (1979); Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a 
Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 637 (2002) (“[The] business 
judgment rule is necessary to encourage . . . directors to engage in the type of informed risk 
taking that is essential to business success.”). 
 79. Kinney, supra note 66, at 177. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Palm & Kearney, supra note 75, at 1337–38. 
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or that the transaction was not the result of valid business judgment.82  To 
determine whether the board is capable of impartially reviewing a demand, the 
court has to consider the board’s decision regarding the actual transaction 
challenged by the shareholder’s claim, while in cases where demand was made 
and rejected the court initially looks only at the board’s decision to reject the 
demand and not at the underlying transaction.83  If the business judgment rule 
does not protect the challenged transaction, the board cannot be deemed 
impartial in considering demand and requiring it would be futile.84  To 
convince the court that demand is excused, the shareholder must “plead with 
particularity facts sufficient to rebut the presumptions of the business judgment 
rule.”85 
Even if a shareholder can overcome the business judgment rule in arguing 
that demand was excused or that the board’s rejection of a demand was 
wrongful, he is not free from the business judgment rule.86  The directors may 
assert the business judgment rule in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim or as a defense on the merits.87  If the shareholder successfully rebuts the 
business judgment rule at trial, the directors must then satisfy the high burden 
of proving the action at issue was entirely fair to the corporation and its 
shareholders.88  If the directors cannot meet this burden, they are liable to the 
corporation for breaching their fiduciary duties.  Below are discussions of two 
shareholder derivative suits brought against corporate directors for allegedly 
breaching their fiduciary duties by backdating corporate stock options. 
 
 82. Id. at 1338, 1341 (noting that a challenged transaction would not be an exercise of valid 
business judgment if the underlying decision involved a breach of the directors’ duties of care or 
loyalty). 
 83. See id. at 1338–41. 
 84. See id. at 1337–38.  To establish that the business judgment rule does not protect the 
underlying transaction, the shareholder must show that the directors were not disinterested in the 
transaction, the directors failed to fully inform themselves before making a decision regarding the 
transaction, or the decision had no rational business purpose and could not have been in the 
corporation’s best interest.  See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 85. Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 
353, 371 (2004); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
 86. Palm & Kearney, supra note 75, at 1349 (“The shareholder must meet its burden of 
proof and rebut the business judgment rule at each stage of the case.”). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
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III.  CASES SETTING THE PRECEDENT FOR DELAWARE’S BACKDATING 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Ryan v. Gifford 
In 2006, Merrill Lynch published a report on semiconductor companies 
that appeared to have engaged in the practice of backdating stock options.89  A 
majority of the options issued by the named companies were granted on days 
where the companies’ stock prices were at their lowest points.90  One company 
named in the report was Maxim Integrated Products, Inc., a designer and 
manufacturer of circuits used in microprocessor equipment located in 
California and incorporated in Delaware.91  The Merrill Lynch report never 
actually accused Maxim of backdating, but it noted the significant 
improbability of a stock having a return ten times higher than the annual 
average during the twenty days following an option grant, as Maxim’s stock 
did.92  The report implied that backdating was the only logical explanation.93 
After the report became public, Maxim shareholder Walter Ryan filed a 
derivative suit against the members of Maxim’s board of directors.94  Ryan 
cited nine specific option grants between 1998 and 2002 made to John Gifford, 
chairman of the board, chief executive officer, and company founder, which 
were too well-timed to correspond with stock price lows to be deemed 
coincidental.95  The options, which could be exercised to purchase millions of 
shares of Maxim stock, were issued on dates with some of the lowest stock 
prices for each particular year.96  Ryan argued that because the board of 
directors allowed grants of backdated options and misled shareholders in 
regards to the options, the directors violated their fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and due care to the company and the shareholders.97 
Backdating stock options violated Maxim’s shareholder-approved stock 
option plans.98  A 1983 Stock Option Plan and a 1999 Stock Incentive Plan, 
both on file with the SEC, required that each option’s exercise price be at or 
above the fair market value of the stock on the date of the grant.99  This meant 
the shareholder-approved plans prohibited the company from issuing in-the-
 
 89. Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 346–47 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 90. Id. at 346. 
 91. See id. at 345–46. 
 92. Id. at 347. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 345–46. 
 95. Id. at 346. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 346, 348. 
 98. See id. at 354. 
 99. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 346–48, 354. 
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money options.  Ryan claimed that Maxim directors backdated stock options to 
make them in-the-money, a violation of the approved option plans, and then 
attempted to conceal this from the shareholders.100 
This intentional disregard of the stock option plan and ensuing dishonesty 
to the shareholders allegedly caused adverse tax and accounting problems for 
Maxim.101  In-the-money options should have been treated as a compensation 
expense, which would have reduced reported earnings.102  The fact that Maxim 
attempted to conceal the in-the-money options overstated the company’s 
profits, and correcting the problem would require revising the financial 
statements and tax payments.103  Also, when the options were exercised, 
Maxim would have received a lesser payment than if the options had not been 
backdated.104   
Ryan sued in Delaware, and the director-defendants responded with a 
motion to dismiss the action.105  They began by arguing Ryan failed to make a 
demand or to plead with particularity that demand was futile.106  The test 
applied under Delaware law to determine if demand is excused as futile 
depends on whether the decision at issue was made by the board of directors in 
place when the suit was brought.107  Since Maxim’s shareholder-approved 
option plans allowed the board to delegate all decisions regarding the issuance 
of stock options to a compensation committee, the granting of the backdated 
options at issue was not considered a transaction entered into by decision of the 
board of directors, but rather by the compensation committee.108 
In this situation, it initially appeared that the applicable test was the one 
laid out in Rales v. Blasband109 for cases where the challenged decision was 
not made by the current board of directors.110  Upon further consideration, 
however, the Ryan court determined that this was actually a situation where the 
challenged decision could be attributed to the board of directors in place when 
the suit was brought.111  Although the compensation committee had been 
delegated the power to administer the challenged options, at all relevant times 
the committee consisted of the same three people, who were also members of 
 
 100. Id. at 348, 354–55. 
 101. See id. at 348. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 348. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 351–52. 
 107. Id. at 352. 
 108. See id. at 353. 
 109. 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993). 
 110. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 353. 
 111. See id. 
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the board of directors at all relevant times.112  Since the board consisted of only 
six members, half of the board approved the decision now at issue.113  The 
court declared that a decision by half of the board could be “imputed to the 
entire board,” making the challenged decision one by the board in place when 
the suit was brought.114 
This meant the test laid out in Aronson v. Lewis115 for demand futility 
applied, and the important inquiry was whether the directors were disinterested 
and independent or whether the decision was made in the exercise of valid 
business judgment.116  If not, the directors could not be impartial, and demand 
would be excused as futile.117  The shareholder bears the burden of alleging 
particularized facts showing a reason to doubt the business judgment rule 
applied.118  The Ryan court acknowledged that creating enough doubt to 
overcome the business judgment rule and survive a motion to dismiss for 
failure to plead demand futility is a difficult feat.119 
In applying the Aronson test to the facts of Ryan, the court went directly to 
the second prong: whether the decision to backdate was an exercise of valid 
business judgment.120  Arguments could have been made in support of 
excusing demand based on the first prong of the test, but this was not a clear-
cut case involving an obvious majority of interested directors.121  The options 
at issue were all granted to Gifford,122 making him clearly interested in the 
transaction because he had a direct financial benefit at stake.  While three other 
directors were openly involved in the transaction because they comprised the 
compensation committee issuing the options, there was a question as to 
whether that made them interested.123  The court passed over the matter in 
favor of the seemingly stronger arguments for excusing demand based on a 
lack of valid business judgment.124 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). 
 116. See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 352–53. 
 117. See id. at 352. 
 118. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
 119. See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 352 n.23. 
 120. Id. at 354. 
 121. For example, in Aronson the court referenced a case where demand was excused as futile 
when five of nine directors approved a stock plan likely to benefit them, making the board 
interested for demand purposes.  Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805, 815 (citing Bergstein v. Texas Int’l 
Co., 453 A.2d 467, 471 (Del. Ch. 1982)). 
 122. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 348. 
 123. Id. at 353. 
 124. See id. at 354–55. 
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Ryan argued that the board of directors could not undertake any action that 
would contravene the shareholder-approved option plans.125  Intentionally 
altering the date of the option grant by changing it to an earlier date where the 
stock’s fair market value was lower, thus making the strike price lower, would 
contravene the terms of the plans requiring that the exercise price be no less 
than the stock’s fair market value on the date the option was granted.126  Thus, 
Ryan claimed the directors’ decision to backdate violated the shareholder-
approved option plans and could not be considered a valid exercise of business 
judgment.127 
In agreeing with Ryan’s argument, the court compared the case with 
Sanders v. Wang,128 where a board of directors allegedly granted shares of 
stock exceeding the number of shares authorized by the employee stock 
ownership plan.129  The Sanders court held that allegations of a board acting in 
violation of an approved plan raised doubt as to whether the board’s decision 
was a valid exercise of business judgment.130  A knowing and intentional 
decision by the board to exceed the limited authority explicitly provided by the 
shareholders was enough to excuse demand as futile.131 
In the Ryan case, the shareholder supported his claim that the directors had 
violated the option plans by alleging that nine instances of option grants over a 
long period came on the date with the lowest stock price of the month or 
year.132  In addition to this suspicious timing, the Merrill Lynch report offered 
empirical evidence that the grant date was manipulated to fall on an already 
known low stock price date.133  Noting that Maxim’s options plans did not 
designate specific times at which options would be granted, the court deemed 
the actual dates chosen “too fortuitous to be mere coincidence.”134  The logical 
inference was that the options were backdated in contravention of the 
shareholder-approved option plan,135 making it doubtful that the decision to 
backdate was an exercise of valid business judgment.136  The court found that 
the shareholder’s pleadings, pointing to specific option grants, plan terms, and 
 
 125. Id. at 354. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 354. 
 128. No. 16640, 1999 WL 1044880 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1999). 
 129. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 354. 
 130. Sanders, 1999 WL 1044880, at *5. 
 131. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 354. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 354–55. 
 135. See id. at 355 n.34 (“[T]he Court may reasonably infer [knowing manipulation of option 
grants], even when applying the heightened pleading standards.”). 
 136. See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 355. 
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supportive empirical evidence, contained sufficient particularity to excuse 
demand as futile.137 
After finding that demand was excused under the Aronson test, the Ryan 
court declared that even if the test in Rales, for situations where the contested 
decision was not made by the board of directors in place when the suit was 
filed, was to be applied, demand would still be excused.138  The test inquires as 
to whether there is reasonable doubt that a majority of the board of directors 
would be disinterested and independent in considering the shareholder’s 
demand.139  Directors cannot be deemed interested merely because they are 
named in the suit,140 but directors who are sued can be deemed interested if 
they face a substantial likelihood of liability.141  The Ryan court said that the 
directors who approved the backdating of options faced “at the very least a 
substantial likelihood of liability.”142  The court could not accept that directors 
who lied to shareholders, especially about an activity that clearly violated a 
shareholder-approved plan, were fulfilling their fiduciary duty of loyalty.143  
Backdating was deemed one of the few instances where a transaction is “so 
egregious on its face” that the board’s approval was not protected by the 
business judgment rule.144  A director’s approval of the transaction was enough 
to raise doubt as to his disinterestedness for purposes of considering demand 
because it created a high likelihood of liability not only for a breach of 
fiduciary duties, but also for other civil and criminal charges.145  Here, the 
three directors comprising the compensation committee allegedly made the 
decision to approve backdated options, and a fourth director, Gifford, received 
the options, giving him a personal financial interest.146  Ryan’s pleading of 
particular facts alleging that a majority of the six directors were interested, 
either financially or in avoiding a situation of personal liability, raised enough 
doubt about the board’s ability to impartially consider the demand to deem the 
demand requirement futile and thus excused.147 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933–34 (Del. 1993)).  The court was 
essentially saying that even if a decision made by half of the board of directors could not be 
imputed to the entire board (which the court found when it analyzed demand excusal under 
Aronson), demand would still be excused. 
 139. Id. 
 140. This would allow shareholders to avoid the demand requirement simply by suing a 
majority of the board of directors. 
 141. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 355. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 355–56. 
 145. See id. at 356 & n.38. 
 146. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 356. 
 147. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] THE SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT AS A RESPONSE TO BACKDATING 609 
After rejecting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to make a 
demand, the court rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted.148  The defendants argued that the 
claim for breach of fiduciary duties failed to allege facts sufficient to rebut the 
business judgment rule’s presumption that the directors acted in accordance 
with their duties, and thus dismissal was required.149  The court noted that 
Ryan had already pled facts raising doubt as to the validity of the business 
judgment exercised in the decision at issue that were deemed sufficient under 
the demand excusal’s higher pleading standard.150  Furthermore, Ryan 
specifically alleged that the defendant-directors acted in bad faith, allowing his 
action to survive the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because 
actions in bad faith would breach a director’s duty of loyalty.151  The Ryan 
court stated that if directors intentionally defied the terms of a shareholder-
approved stock option plan and then attempted to mislead the shareholders 
about the options granted by making false public disclosures concerning the 
grants, it would amount to conduct in bad faith.152  Thus, the shareholder pled 
with particularity allegations of bad faith sufficient to rebut the business 
judgment rule’s presumed protection of the directors’ decision, allowing the 
claim to survive.153 
The court did declare that at trial, after having time for discovery, the 
shareholder would need to provide evidence to actually prove the allegations 
and he could not merely rely on inferences drawn from empirical data to make 
his case.154  If Ryan could prove the factual allegations he pled, the business 
judgment rule would not protect the underlying transaction.155  The directors 
would still be free to argue the challenged decision was entirely fair to the 
company and shareholders, but that is a difficult standard to meet.156 
Ryan’s derivative action thus survived the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.157  The case has since moved to the discovery stage preceding trial.  
However, its result, which seemed to signal that the court was willing to hold 
directors liable for participating in corporate backdating practices, appeared to 
be contradicted in Desimone v. Barrows.158 
 
 148. See id. at 358. 
 149. See id. at 356. 
 150. Id. at 357. 
 151. See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 357–58 (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006)). 
 152. See id. at 358. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 358 n.49. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 358 n.49. 
 157. See id. at 358. 
 158. 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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B. Desimone v. Barrows 
The next shareholder derivative action stemming from a case of alleged 
stock option backdating heard by the Delaware Chancery Court did not fare as 
well for the shareholder-plaintiff.  In 2006, Sycamore Networks, Inc. fell under 
the scope of an investigation conducted by the SEC and the U.S. Department 
of Justice for alleged backdating practices.159  A Sycamore shareholder, John 
Desimone, brought a derivative action on behalf of the corporation against the 
board of directors and certain recipients of the allegedly backdated grants.160  
His claim relied largely on an anonymous internal memo that suggested that in 
2000, option grants to six employees were backdated so the grant dates fell on 
the date where the company’s stock was trading at the lowest price of the 
preceding quarter.161  After this memo came to light, Sycamore’s own audit 
committee conducted an internal investigation and concluded that certain stock 
option grants had been accounted for improperly.162  The company restated its 
earnings for the years 2000–2003.163 
Sycamore, a company involved in the creation and sale of optical 
networking products, had a six-member board of directors.164  Two directors 
held positions within the company as chairman of the board and chief 
executive officer/president.165  Neither owned Sycamore stock options.166  The 
other four directors were outside directors, meaning they did not hold positions 
of employment within the company.167  According to a shareholder-approved 
option plan, the outside directors received compensation in the form of stock 
options for their service on the board.168  Two of the outside directors also 
served on the board’s compensation committee at all relevant times.169  
Additionally, the company had a three-person audit committee, comprised of 
different outside directors at various times.170 
The challenged option grants fell into three different types: grants to rank-
and-file employees, grants to officers, and grants to outside directors.171  Each 
of the four outside directors allegedly received backdated options.172  Five 
 
 159. Id. at 912. 
 160. Id. at 912–13. 
 161. Id. at 913. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 913. 
 164. Id. at 918. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 919. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 919. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 913. 
 172. Id. at 917. 
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executive officers each allegedly received at least one grant of backdated 
options.173  These officers, along with the six members of the board of 
directors, were named as defendants in Desimone’s lawsuit.174 
The backdating scheme Desimone described revolved around one 
defendant, Sycamore’s former chief financial officer (CFO).175  She allegedly 
instructed a former director of human resources to carry out the backdating 
practice within the company.176  This director was given orders to falsify 
personnel documents so they matched the altered option grant dates.177  If a 
new hire received options, his start date on file would be changed to 
corroborate the chosen date for the backdated options.178  After the director’s 
dismissal, he presented the board with an anonymously written internal memo 
describing six option grants that had been backdated to a date when 
Sycamore’s stock traded at $29.125.179  Within twenty days, the stock price 
had increased to $51.38.180  The options were, however, subject to a three-year 
vesting period.181  The memo also included a discussion of ways to conceal 
each backdated option grant, such as creating new offer letters, and assessed 
the risk of audit discovery associated with each cover-up action.182 
The challenged options were all issued under the authority of Sycamore’s 
two shareholder-approved stock option plans.183  The Non-Employee Director 
Stock Option Plan provided that the outside directors would receive 
compensation in the form of 30,000 options annually.184  The plan directed that 
the options would be automatically granted every year on the date of the 
company’s annual stockholder meeting.185  Each option’s strike price was 
required to be equal to the stock’s fair market value on the grant date.186  The 
options could be exercised immediately but were subject to a vesting period 
 
 173. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 919. 
 174. Id. at 913, 919. 
 175. See id. at 919. 
 176. Id. at 922. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 922. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.  Therefore, while the recipient had an instant profit on the options, it was not 
immediately realizable.  Before the vesting period passed, the stock price actually dropped below 
$10 a share, erasing any profit.  Id. at 922 n.28.  While some may argue that this defeats any need 
for filing a derivative action, as the option holders ultimately took a loss, the actions that 
allegedly occurred within the company still brought about serious concerns relating to breaches of 
fiduciary duties that needed to be addressed. 
 182. Id. at 922–23. 
 183. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 919. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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between one and three years, meaning that even if an option was exercised, the 
acquired stock could not be sold or borrowed against until the vesting period 
passed.187 
The Stock Incentive Plan authorized the option grants to company officers 
and employees.188  This plan was to be administered by a committee of two or 
more members of the board of directors.189  The plan allowed the board to 
delegate all option-granting power to an executive officer or officers, so long 
as the board set the maximum number of shares subject to grant.190  Unlike the 
Non-Employee Director Plan, the Stock Incentive Plan did not require that 
options be granted with an exercise price equal to the stock’s fair market value, 
unless they were intended to qualify for the special tax treatment available only 
to certain at-the-money options.191  While Desimone did not claim that the 
challenged options issued to the officers and employees were intended to 
qualify for this special treatment, he did allege that Sycamore accounted for the 
options as though they were priced at the fair market value of the stock on the 
date of issuance.192  He further alleged that Sycamore led shareholders, the 
market, and regulatory authorities to believe that the more favorable tax and 
accounting treatment for at-the-money options applied to the options issued.193  
The compensation committee was to set the vesting schedule for these option 
grants, and Desimone stated that the employee grants at issue were subject to a 
three-year vesting period.194 
In bringing his derivative action, Desimone did not make a demand upon 
Sycamore’s board of directors to address the issue of backdated options.195  
The defendants responded to his suit with a motion to dismiss for failure to 
make a demand or to plead with particularity that demand is excused.196  The 
parties agreed that the Rales test for demand excusal applied here because the 
challenged decision was not made by the current board of directors.197  The 
 
 187. Id. at 919–20 (“[The] vesting schedule . . . prevented the recipients from realizing any 
immediate value from the options.”). 
 188. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 920. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 921. 
 193. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 921. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 927. 
 196. See id. at 927–28. 
 197. The court does not go into detail about why the decision was not made by the board of 
directors, but since the option plans delegate authority over the grants to the compensation 
committee, it appears that the court is implying the committee made the challenged decisions.  
See id. at 928.  Since the committee here is composed of two directors and there are six directors 
on the board, id. at 918–19, the committee’s decision cannot be imputed to the entire board as it 
was in Ryan when half of the directors also served on the compensation committee. 
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court had to determine whether the current board could have considered a 
demand with independent and disinterested judgment.198  To excuse demand, 
the court required particularized facts alleging either that a majority of board 
members were interested or not independent from those who were or that a 
majority of the board members faced a substantial threat of personal liability 
for the challenged transaction, compromising their ability to make an impartial 
decision about demand.199 
The court first applied the test to the options granted to rank-and-file 
employees.200  When Sycamore restated its financials in 2005, it admitted that 
a number of options issued to employees were actually granted in-the-money 
even though the company had concealed this and accounted for the options as 
though they were issued at fair market value.201  However, there was no 
suggestion that any of the directors had a personal interest in those grants or 
were not independent of the recipients of the grants.202 
Therefore, for Desimone to prove demand was excused under the Rales 
test, he had to allege with particularity that the directors faced a substantial 
threat of personal liability for the grants.203  The shareholder-approved plan 
expressed that the board was free to delegate authority for granting options to 
non-directors.204  While two directors made up the compensation committee, 
the court found the logical inference was that such small option grants to 
lower-level employees would have been overseen by corporate officers, 
especially since the directors on the committee were the outside directors who 
had no day-to-day employment within the company.205  Desimone did not 
claim otherwise, making no allegation that the directors were responsible for 
issuing the grants or even directing the process by which the options were 
issued, which would include selecting the grant date.206  Desimone himself 
referred to the former CFO, a non-director, as the “enforcer” of Sycamore’s 
backdating practice.207  The particular facts pled did not indicate that the 
directors shared her culpability.208  Desimone admitted he could not show that 
the compensation committee was aware the employee options it approved were 
backdated, and there was no requirement in the plan that the options be issued 
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at fair market value.209  Thus, even though Sycamore admitted wrongdoing in 
relation to the grants, the complaint failed to plead with particularity facts 
sufficiently alleging that a majority of the directors faced a substantial 
likelihood of liability for their involvement in the backdating that occurred.210 
Desimone further argued that the directors’ ignorance of the fact that the 
options granted to the employees were being backdated amounted to a 
violation of the directors’ duty to monitor corporate compliance with the 
law.211  He alleged that the internal controls Sycamore had in place were 
flawed in that they had allowed the backdating practice to be carried out with 
little difficulty.212  He claimed that the directors, especially the three on the 
audit committee, in fulfilling their duty to monitor, should have detected, 
prevented, or stopped the backdating and associated material misstatements in 
the financial records.213  Desimone argued that this unsatisfactory monitoring 
amounted to a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties.214 
For directors to be liable for failing to monitor corporate compliance they 
must have acted in bad faith, knowingly breaching their fiduciary duties.215  
The court said that for the shareholder to successfully argue that failure to 
monitor served as the basis for substantial likelihood of director liability, he 
would have to plead “facts suggesting that the board knew that internal 
controls were inadequate, that the inadequacies could leave room for illegal or 
materially harmful behavior, and that the board chose to do nothing about the 
control deficiencies that it knew existed.”216  This heavy burden is why the 
court in In re Caremark labeled a failure to monitor claim one of the most 
difficult a plaintiff can hope to successfully establish.217 
Desimone never alleged particular facts showing Sycamore’s internal 
controls were inadequate.218  He made no claim that the directors, the audit 
committee, or any auditors were aware of, or even suspected, any control 
weaknesses.219  He also did not suggest that any of these people had 
indications that backdating was occurring within the company.220  Desimone 
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did argue that the internal memo implied company-wide awareness of control 
problems and the occurrence of backdating.221  The court, however, refused to 
infer from the memo that the directors were actually aware of the 
backdating.222  The memo itself only went to one employee, and it detailed the 
efforts undertaken to cover up the backdating and prevent it from being 
discovered in an audit.223  This did not support the claim that awareness of the 
backdating was widespread within the company.224  Desimone therefore did 
not plead with particularity a claim that would excuse demand on the basis that 
the directors were interested, and thus not impartial in considering the 
employee options.225 
The Desimone court then applied the Rales test for demand excusal to the 
options granted to Sycamore officers.226  Again there was no allegation that 
any member of the board of directors was personally interested in the grants or 
could not act independently of the recipients.227  Desimone claimed that two 
sets of option grants were backdated.228  Both grants came when market prices 
had dipped to low points, with increases following.229  The first challenged 
grant involved the issuance of options to the former CFO and other officers, 
after which Sycamore’s stock price increased by over 50% in the next twenty 
days.230  The second challenged grant involved the issuance of more options to 
the ex-CFO and another defendant-officer.231  These options increased only 
10% over the following twenty days, but Sycamore essentially admitted that 
the grant date had been backdated when it disclosed that the defendant-
officer’s options had been repriced to reflect the stock’s fair market value on 
the date believed to be the correct date of issuance.232 
The court accepted that the compensation committee was less likely to 
delegate authority over these large option grants to officers, as it would be 
inappropriate for the officers to oversee grants to themselves.233  However, 
Desimone did not allege that any directors were aware the option grants they 
approved were backdated.234  None of the facts pled alleged that any director 
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was actually involved in the process of carrying out the backdating, and the 
court refused to infer that the committee knew the options were backdated.235  
Since the pleadings failed to allege with sufficient particularity that the 
directors knowingly issued backdated options to the officers, it was not 
substantially likely that a majority of the board faced personal liability 
stemming from the transaction.236  Furthermore, the court said that even if it 
could infer that the directors on the compensation committee knew the options 
had been backdated and thus were substantially likely to be personally liable, 
this would not excuse demand.237  The committee consisted of only two out of 
six directors so less than half the board would be impartial in its ability to 
consider demand.238  Thus, the demand requirement was not excused as 
futile.239   
The court then analyzed the option grants to the outside directors under the 
Rales test.240  These were grants of 30,000 options to the four outside directors, 
which the Non-Employee Director Plan automatically scheduled on the date of 
the company’s annual meeting.241  Desimone argued that because the grants 
were issued on dates where the market price was so favorable, backdating must 
have occurred.242  Four out of the six directors on the board were outside 
directors and therefore received the options at issue.243  Thus, a majority of the 
board had a personal financial interest in the transaction.244  Furthermore, the 
two other directors on the board could not be considered independent because 
they relied on board approval to maintain their positions within the 
company.245  Thus, under the Rales test, demand was excused as futile because 
the board could not impartially consider the challenged transaction.246 
After the court determined that demand was excused, it considered the 
defendants’ argument that the complaint should be dismissed for failing to 
state a claim.247  The court noted Desimone never alleged that the director 
grants at issue were not made on the date of Sycamore’s annual meeting, as the 
shareholder-approved plan required.248  Nor was there an allegation that the 
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meeting dates were manipulated to fall on days where the stock price was at a 
low.249  The grant was prescheduled and non-discretionary per the plan.250  The 
court held that it could not logically infer that a claim for backdating, 
constituting a breach of fiduciary duties, had been made since the date of 
issuance was chosen in advance and the options were actually issued on the 
chosen date.251 
Therefore, none of Desimone’s claims survived the motion to dismiss, 
even though his case was decided after the shareholder in Ryan v. Gifford 
received a favorable ruling in a derivative action stemming from a corporate 
backdating situation.  Following is a further analysis of shareholder derivative 
suits filed in response to backdating allegations, an examination of why the 
outcomes in these two cases were different, and a discussion of what 
shareholders can expect in the future. 
IV.  A PREFERENCE FOR SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND THEIR 
CHANCE FOR SUCCESS IN THE FUTURE 
A. A Derivative Suit Is More Attuned to the Company’s Best Interests than a 
Direct Suit in a Backdating Situation 
While the law technically allows companies to backdate because it allows 
companies to grant in-the-money options, it requires that companies disclose 
the fact that options are granted in-the-money and properly account for the 
options by recording the associated compensation expense.252  However, the 
actual practice of backdating appears to be a practice of avoiding disclosure.253  
The benefits of backdating would be eliminated if companies were required to 
disclose that it was occurring.  Some scholars argue that the only problem with 
backdating is the lack of disclosure.254  Yet by backdating, companies 
essentially lied to shareholders, regulators, and the market in general.255  They 
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lied about the date the option was granted, whether it was priced at the stock’s 
fair market value, the amount of compensation given, and whether tax and 
accounting consequences would apply.256 
Furthermore, in many instances backdating violated shareholder-approved 
option compensation plans.257  Not only is the true nature of the transaction not 
disclosed to the shareholders, but the action also goes beyond the scope of 
authority expressly granted to the directors by the shareholders.  Therefore, 
many shareholders feel that directors who engage in backdating company stock 
options breach their fiduciary duties. 
The same circumstances that would make backdating a breach of fiduciary 
duties would qualify it as a violation of Rule 10b-5.  A plaintiff bringing a 10b-
5 claim must prove the defendant made a manipulative or deceitful material 
misstatement or nondisclosure regarding the sale or purchase of securities.258  
The defendant’s conduct must be intentional, and the plaintiff must establish 
causation between the conduct and the harm suffered.259  The plaintiff is 
required to demonstrate the amount of loss incurred, which would equal the 
decline in the stock’s value attributable to the misstatement or 
nondisclosure.260  With backdating, often no significant loss is apparent 
because stock prices did not noticeably decrease when backdating schemes 
were revealed.261  This, along with the fact that the statute of limitations for a 
10b-5 claim had often run by the time the backdating was discovered, 
encouraged shareholders to turn to the derivative suit.262 
A derivative suit better serves the interests of the company than a 
shareholder’s direct claim.  If a shareholder brings a Rule 10b-5 action, the 
company is forced to pay out damages.  As already discussed, the majority of 
shareholders did not suffer significant monetary damages in the form of lower 
stock prices, so it would be better for the company, and indirectly the 
shareholders, to avoid paying out any more and instead have the recovery 
come back to the company.  Companies within which backdating occurred face 
the risk of paying penalties to the SEC and having to restate their financials.  
They may incur tax liabilities.  Plus, they receive lower payments when the 
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options were exercised than they would have if backdating had not occurred.  
A shareholder derivative suit helps the company recover some of its loss.  
Backdated options could be rescinded or repriced.  Option recipients could be 
required to disgorge profits gained from backdating.  Those responsible for 
backdating could even be forced to reimburse the company for any penalties it 
had to pay.  Changes in corporate governance should help prevent future 
problems. 
B. The Future of the Derivative Suit as a Successful Method for Addressing 
Backdating 
1. Distinguishing Ryan and Desimone 
After the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Ryan, it appeared that 
Chancellor Chandler was paving the way for shareholder-plaintiffs to bring 
derivative suits against companies based on the backdating of stock options.263  
Chancellor Chandler excused demand as futile, found the business judgment 
rule would not protect the directors’ decision if the allegations were true, and 
allowed the case to go forward.264  Many potential shareholder-plaintiffs likely 
viewed this as a victory.  Ryan’s complaint against the Maxim directors was 
largely based on circumstantial evidence, including statistical analysis, from 
which the court was willing to infer that the directors were involved in the 
backdating practice.265  The standard for demand excusal in a backdating case 
did not seem out of reach, and the court said that empirical evidence would be 
considered.266  Thus, it seemed that shareholders would not have too difficult 
of a time reaching the discovery stage, where they hoped to find firmer 
evidence of the directors’ involvement in the backdating practice. 
A few months later, Vice Chancellor Strine changed directions in 
Desimone.267  His opinion suggested it was not going to be easy for 
shareholders to meet the pleading standard for demand excusal in a derivative 
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action based on allegations of backdating.268  He rejected the complaint for 
failing to plead with particularity facts establishing that the board of directors 
knowingly issued or approved backdated stock options.269  Since the facts did 
not specifically allege that the board knew of the backdating, the shareholder’s 
claim was denied the chance to move on to the discovery stage. 
On first glance, the results in Ryan and Desimone seem conflicting.  The 
claims were very similar, yet one survived a motion to dismiss and one did not.  
Both alleged that the boards of directors were engaged in a practice of 
backdating stock options.  Both relied mostly on circumstantial and empirical 
evidence to support their allegations.  In fact, Desimone seemed to have more 
evidence that backdating occurred as the company had already restated 
earnings and repriced certain options after conducting an internal investigation 
into the backdating practice by the time the shareholder sued.270  The 
Desimone case also relied partly on an internal memo describing certain 
backdating practices within the corporation.271  Yet, the Desimone case was 
dismissed and the Ryan case moved forward. 
There were certain key differences between the backdating claims alleged 
in Ryan and Desimone that may have contributed to the different outcomes.  In 
Desimone, Vice Chancellor Strine refused to infer that because the grants were 
made on dates with some of the lowest stock prices the directors must have 
knowingly backdated the options in breach of their fiduciary duties.272  This 
does not mean that backdating did not occur, but that there were not particular 
factual allegations from which Vice Chancellor Strine was willing to infer that 
the board was aware of the practice.  Such a conclusion was bolstered by the 
fact that the shareholder-approved option plans allowed oversight of option 
granting to be delegated to company officers.273  This made it harder to infer 
that the board had knowledge of the backdating.  It was plausible that an 
officer had been authorized to administer the option grants, and the board was 
unaware of any impropriety.274  Vice Chancellor Strine required that the 
shareholder allege with particularity that the directors knowingly backdated, 
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and since Desimone could not sufficiently allege “how, when, or by whom” 
the grants were issued, he did not meet this standard.275 
In Ryan, the shareholder-approved plans did not explicitly state that 
authority over option issuances could be delegated to non-directors.  The 
compensation committee, comprised of half the board of directors, oversaw 
option grants.276  Chancellor Chandler said the committee could be reasonably 
expected to know the actual date of the grant as well as the date listed as the 
issue date.277  This made it easier for Chancellor Chandler to infer that if the 
allegations of backdating were true, the directors were at least aware of the 
practice, if not actually engaging in it.  As he said, an allegation that directors 
backdated options would simultaneously allege that they acted knowingly in 
doing so.278 
While refusing to impute knowledge to the directors in regards to the 
backdating of the employee option grants might be justified because 
administration of the options was delegated to company officers, the rationale 
does not apply as easily to Desimone’s officer grants.  Vice Chancellor Strine 
admits that administration of the large option grants to company officers would 
not likely have been delegated to the officers, as it was highly improbable that 
they would oversee grants to themselves.279  After admitting that the 
compensation committee likely retained authority over the grants, he refused to 
infer that those on the committee would have been aware that the options were 
backdated.280  If neither the officers nor the compensation committee 
administered the option grants, who did?  Vice Chancellor Strine went on to 
say that even if it could be inferred that the two directors on the compensation 
committee had been aware that the options were backdated, which according to 
Ryan would be sufficient to find lack of valid business judgment and personal 
interest due to substantial likelihood of liability, it would make no difference 
because a majority of the directors would still be impartial.281  However, in 
Vice Chancellor Strine’s later analysis of the outside director grants, where he 
found demand excused, he suggested that the two inside directors were not 
independent of the outside directors because they relied on the outside 
directors to keep them in their executive positions within the company.282  He 
failed to make any mention of this lack of independence when he declared that 
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even if the compensation committee were deemed interested, the majority of 
the board remained impartial. 
Another distinguishing factor between Desimone and Ryan stressed by 
Vice Chancellor Strine was the fact that the Stock Incentive Plan in Desimone, 
authorizing option grants to officers and employees, did not require that the 
options be issued with an exercise price equal to the stock’s fair market value 
on the date of issuance.283  This meant that the company could backdate and 
issue in-the-money options without contravening a shareholder-approved plan.  
It may be that the lack of such a requirement in the shareholder-approved 
option plan is why Vice Chancellor Strine would not infer that the 
compensation committee knowingly approved backdated options.  Since it was 
not a violation of the plan to issue options below fair market value, there was a 
possibility that the board was innocently approving backdated grants.  In Ryan, 
however, the shareholder-approved plan clearly required that all options be 
granted at the stock’s fair market value.284  Chancellor Chandler emphasized 
the fact that by backdating the directors acted in violation of their shareholder-
granted power.285  In finding that demand was excused because the board’s 
decision was not an exercise of valid business judgment, it was key that the 
board had decided to disregard the shareholder-approved option plan. 
Without a clause in a shareholder-approved plan requiring options be 
issued at fair market value, a decision by the board to engage in backdating 
cannot likely be deemed so egregious on its face that it could not be the 
exercise of valid business judgment.  When there is no explicit limitation on 
directors to prevent them from granting in-the-money options, the decision to 
backdate is not as clearly suspect.  However, even if directors are not violating 
a shareholder-approved plan when they backdate, they still lie to the 
shareholders, authorities, and market when they conceal it.  Directors failing to 
properly disclose and account for options, and instead trying to pass them off 
as at-the-money options by issuing fraudulent paperwork to that effect, still 
commit a falsehood that should amount to a breach of the duty of loyalty.  In 
Ryan, Chancellor Chandler even acknowledged that it was hard to imagine a 
scenario where a director could lie to his shareholders and still fulfill the duty 
of loyalty.286 
A final distinguishing feature between Desimone and Ryan was that the 
Desimone grants to the outside directors were set to occur automatically on a 
predetermined date.  In Ryan all of the challenged grants were discretionary, 
and evidence showed that over a period of years the grants consistently fell on 
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dates where the stock price was unusually low.287  In Desimone, the challenged 
grants to the outside directors came on the date of the annual stockholder 
meeting, chosen in advance.288  There was no allegation that the meeting date 
was manipulated.289  Only grants from two years over a multi-year period were 
challenged, suggesting that in the other years the grants had not come on dates 
quite as beneficial for the recipient-directors.290  This is consistent with the 
purpose of a nondiscretionary, prescheduled option issuance plan.  There will 
be good dates and bad dates, and the recipient shares in the gains and the 
losses. 
2. Where the Delaware Courts Are Headed 
Although Vice Chancellor Strine’s change of course in Desimone leaned 
toward dismissing shareholder derivative suits based on allegations of 
backdating by requiring somewhat rigorous pleading standards,291 the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s future approach might not be quite as anti-
shareholder as that case hinted.292  In Conrad v. Blank, decided post-Desimone, 
Vice Chancellor Lamb employed a more Ryan-like approach in accepting the 
shareholder’s circumstantial evidence, including statistical analysis, alleging 
that the directors affirmatively backdated options or wrongly approved their 
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issuance.293  Although the directors argued the complaint failed to plead with 
particularity that the directors knowingly backdated, the court relied on Ryan 
to find it could be reasonably inferred that directors on the compensation 
committee acted knowingly in granting backdated options because they would 
be expected to know the date listed on the option as well as the date they 
approved the grant.294  The court excused demand as futile, allowing the case 
to proceed to discovery.295 
The cases show there are certain factors that, if present, will make the 
chances of success on a shareholder derivative action based on allegations of 
backdating much stronger.  Being able to allege the directors acted in violation 
of a shareholder-approved option plan will vastly strengthen a claim that 
demand is excused as futile because the directors either did not exercise valid 
business judgment when they disregarded the plan or put themselves in 
positions of substantial personal liability by violating the plan.  Showing a 
pattern of grants falling on dates where the stock is at a very low point, as 
opposed to only a few isolated instances, is beneficial.  The courts have been 
quite receptive to statistical evidence in support of backdating claims.  Any 
restatement of earnings or other disclosure by the company that the options 
were improperly accounted for would be favorable.   
Other factors are less favorable.  A clause in the option plan allowing the 
directors to delegate authority over option granting to someone else within the 
corporation will be problematic.  Also, if the option grants were prescheduled, 
the chances that the court will find misconduct occurred are greatly reduced.  
A shareholder should closely consider the individual circumstances of a case 
before deciding whether it is worth pursuing.  Courts will not be sympathetic 
to claims rushed forward at the first mention that backdating may have 
 
 293. Conrad, 940 A.2d at 35.  This was a shareholder derivative action against Staples, Inc.  
See id. at 34.   The shareholder alleged that the directors knowingly backdated at least twelve 
specific option grants over a ten-year period in violation of a shareholder-approved option plan 
requiring the grants to be priced at the stock’s fair market value.  Id. at 31, 33.  In support of this, 
the shareholder relied on the fact that most grants came on dates where the stock price was at the 
low for the quarter or month, as well as statistical data showing the high return on the options 
compared to the average annual rate.  Id. at 34–35.  The company had also issued a report that 
certain options were accounted for with incorrect measurement dates, although it denied 
intentional wrongdoing.  Id. at 33–34.  The court applied the Rales test for demand excusal 
because the parties agreed that the compensation committee, comprised of three of the company’s 
ten directors, issued the options, not the board itself.  Id. at 36–37.  Two other directors were 
recipients of the challenged options.  Id. at 38.  Thus, the court concluded that half of the board 
was interested in the transaction, either financially or by facing a substantial risk of personal 
liability, and therefore could not impartially consider demand.  Id. at 40. 
 294. Id. at 40. 
 295. Id. 
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occurred, with the shareholder failing to make pre-suit demand or to present 
through the pleadings allegations showing that demand is excused.296 
If demand is excused, the shareholder will have to gather more concrete 
evidence that the directors knowingly backdated company stock options to 
survive the case on the merits.  Statistical analysis and financial restatements 
will likely not be enough.297  Surviving the motion to dismiss gets the 
shareholder to the discovery stage, where he may be able to uncover the 
necessary evidence.  At this stage, the defendants may be more willing to settle 
rather than go through the long and expensive discovery and trial process.  In 
settlement discussions, or even after a successful trial on the merits, the 
shareholder is in a good position to repair some of the harm that backdating 
may have caused to the company. 
In cases where the directors’ awareness of the backdating can be shown, 
the derivative suit proves to be an advantageous forum for addressing the 
matter.  It provides a means of punishing misconduct and regulating the 
relationship between the company and its agents, the directors.  Since the 
major problems with backdating are the lack of disclosure and lying to the 
shareholders, the preferred means of addressing the problems should involve 
the parties within the company.  There needs to be some check on those with 
the power to act for the company, and the derivative suit gives shareholders a 
way to address improper conduct by those in charge.  The derivative suit 
allows the company to recover some of the loss it may have incurred by 
directors’ misconduct.  It also provides an important way to achieve changes in 
the company’s practices.298  While new accounting rules may have 
significantly decreased the likelihood of backdating in the future, the fact that 
it occurred shows there were people within the company who believed it was 
acceptable, and there were insufficient controls to stop it.299  The changes in 
corporate governance and deterrence of future misconduct that the derivative 
 
 296. See, e.g., Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 951 (2007) (deriding the shareholder for 
filing suit without seeking access to corporate books or records and before the directors’ 
investigation was complete). 
 297. At trial, after having the benefit of discovery, the plaintiff has the burden to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the business judgment rule does not protect the transaction 
because the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by backdating.  See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 
A.2d 341, 358 n.49 (Del. Ch. 2007).  However, in the most egregious cases, where there is little 
doubt that the directors were involved in backdating, this evidence may be sufficient.  Id. at 358. 
 298. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. 
 299. See The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 403, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(C) (2006) (requiring 
option grants be reported to the SEC within two business days after issuance);  SHARE-BASED 
PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123R (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 
2004), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_FAS123R.pdf (requiring that companies record 
a compensation expense for both in-the-money and at-the-money options). 
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suit provides make it a preferable choice over other means of regulatory 
enforcement.300 
Companies should prefer a derivative suit over the alternative forums for 
addressing the problem.  The final results in a derivative suit are more 
satisfactory than paying large civil fines or damages to shareholders in direct 
suits.  Many have also suggested that there has been an over-criminalization of 
corporate law and that backdating should not amount to a criminal violation.301  
The shareholder derivative action provides a means for punishing the 
misconduct without criminalizing it.  The problem is that the SEC and Justice 
Department are not asking which forum the company would prefer, so if there 
were instances of backdating, chances are the company could have to address 
them in all forums.  If, however, companies were allowed to choose a forum 
for regulating the problems of backdating, the shareholder derivative suit 
should be at the top of the list.  It is the one option that focuses only on 
restoring some of the company’s loss or correcting its problems, instead of 
increasing its loss.302 
CONCLUSION 
As the cases here demonstrate, each backdating scenario is unique.  Not all 
backdating cases can be linked together, and not all of them should have the 
same result.  Each instance of backdating will not necessarily translate into a 
successful shareholder derivative suit because if the directors were unaware of 
the backdating, then it is doubtful that shareholders could succeed on a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duties.  As Vice Chancellor Strine explained, “a 
cautious, non-generic approach to addressing the various options practices now 
under challenge in many lawsuits” is necessary.303  However, as this analysis 
suggests, when certain key factors are present and the shareholder is able to 
 
 300. While there may be little need for deterring backdating in the future, the derivative suit 
can still help deter directors from failing to make disclosures, or essentially lying, to shareholders 
about corporate practices in the future. 
 301. See Dick Thornburgh, Keynote Luncheon Address at the Georgetown University Law 
Center Conference on Corporate Criminality: Legal, Ethical, and Managerial Implications: The 
Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The Dilemma of Artificial 
Entities and Artificial Crimes (March 15, 2007), in 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279 (2007) 
(criticizing Congress for abusing “its power in creating more criminal statutes involving non-
traditional criminal conduct”); Larry E. Ribstein, Criminalizing Backdating, on Ideoblog, 
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/07/criminalizing_b.html (Jul. 21, 2006, 07:30 EST) 
(“[C]riminalizing this business practice [of backdating] is not the answer.”). 
 302. SEC charges and Rule 10b-5 actions will likely result in the corporation paying penalties 
or damages.  Criminal charges against individuals may decrease a company’s ability to attract 
qualified management and do nothing to address the internal management problems the company 
experienced. 
 303. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 931 (2007). 
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show the directors were involved in backdating, addressing the matter through 
a shareholder derivative suit is the preferable option. 
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